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EXPORT CONTROLS ON HIGH TECHNOLOGY
Nancy K. Frank*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 19791 (the
"1979 Act") as amended by the Export Administration Amend-
ments Act of 19852 (the "Amendments") (collectively referred to as
the "Act"), all commodity and technical data exports from the
United States of commodities and technical data are subject to a
system of export controls. Every export must either be authorized
under a general license or exported according to the terms of a vali-
dated license. The Export Administration Regulations (the "Regu-
lations") 3 which implement the Act are regularly revised to
incorporate the changes in current United States foreign and do-
mestic policy, as well as changing technical developments. Keeping
up-to-date with the Regulations can be a challenge for even the
most experienced exporter. This paper provides an overview of the
Act and the Regulations, focusing on export controls as they apply
to the high technology industry.
II. THE ADMINISTRATION OF EXPORT CONTROLS
The Act imposes two basic types of export controls, the export
licensing requirements and the antiboycott restrictions. All ex-
ported items, including commodities and technical data, are subject
to both the export licensing requirements and the antiboycott
restrictions.
Section 3 of the Act states that the purpose of export controls
is threefold. Controls are to be used: (1) to restrict the export of
goods and technology which could make a significant contribution
Copyright © 1987 Nancy K. Frank. All Rights Reserved.
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1. Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1970).
2. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, Title I, § 102,
99 Stat. 120 (1985).
3. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 368.1-368.4.
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to the military potential of any other country or combination of
countries and could prove detrimental to the national security of
the United States; (2) to restrict the export of goods and technology
where necessary to significantly advance the foreign policy of the
United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations; and
(3) to restrict the export of goods, where necessary, to protect the
domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and
to reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand.4
The federal government attempts to strike a balance between
these goals and its desire to encourage free trade and improve the
current trade deficit.' The Act and the Regulations reflect the un-
derlying tensions resulting from government efforts to reconcile
these often conflicting goals under a system of export controls. One
commentator points out that while the United States government
has taken significant steps towards deregulating much of the Ameri-
can economy, it has not deregulated the international high technol-
ogy industry.' In fact, as the technology becomes more
sophisticated, high technology exports are becoming more regulated
and more strictly controlled. U.S. manufacturers and distributors
of sophisticated high technology products find themselves caught in
the political policy struggles among the advocates of free and un-
restricted trade, the protectors of national security and the advo-
cates of foreign policy controls. As commercial innovations lead to
more sophisticated military applications, the tensions between trade
and control will be exacerbated. The trend towards smaller, faster,
more portable and highly capable business and personal computers
makes the potential for military application of civilian technology
both possible and probable. The Western countries are committed
to preventing or, at least making more difficult, the diversion of vi-
tal technology to the Soviet Union and the East Bloc nations.7
There are five statutory bases for imposing the U.S. export con-
trols. Commodities and technical data may be controlled for na-
tional security, foreign policy, short supply, nuclear non-
proliferation or crime control reasons. For most exports, the Gov-
ernment imposes limited controls. However, exports of certain
groups of commodities, involving specific levels of technologies,
destined for particular countries, are strictly controlled and require
4. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1985).
5. T. Murphy, Technology Transfer Problems and Prospects, a paper given at the
Wilton Park Conference (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and European High-
Tech. Industries (July 8, 1985).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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authorization through validated licenses generally issued by the De-
partment of Commerce, Office of Export Administration ("OEA").8
Countries are divided into "Country Groups" to which the Govern-
ment applies similar export restrictions. A copy of the Country
Groups is attached as Appendix A.
The following five types of transactions are regulated: (1) di-
rect exports of U.S. goods and technical data; (2) reexports of U.S.
goods and technical data from one foreign country to another; (3)
foreign use of U.S. goods as parts and components of foreign-made
products and the disposition of those products; (4) disposition of
foreign-made "direct products" of U.S. technical data; and (5) ex-
ports of purely foreign products by foreign companies controlled by
U.S. persons.
The Act requires the Department of Commerce ("Commerce")
to consult with other government agencies, primarily the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, in order to coordinate their export ad-
ministration activities. Commerce must also consult with the
Coordinating Committee ("COCOM"), a multilateral group of fif-
teen member countries.9 COCOM is charged with the responsibil-
ity of developing uniform control policies on the export of computer
hardware, computer software, telecommunications switching equip-
ment and related technology to prevent such products and technol-
ogy from being directed to the Soviet Union and the other
communist countries in the Eastern Bloc. COCOM review is re-
quired for certain commodities going to certain countries and must
be obtained after the necessary United States agencies have ap-
proved a transaction.10
III. OVERVIEW OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985
On July 12, 1985, President Reagan signed into law the Export
8. Export controls may also be administered by other government departments, e.g.,
Department of State (export of arms, ammunition, implements of war and related technical
data), Department of Defense (arms, ammunition), National Security Counsel (arms, ammu-
nition), Treasury Department (antiboycott rules, enforcement); Department of Energy (spe-
cial nuclear equipment and related materials); Department of Justice (narcotics); and the
Maritime Administration (certain water-craft).
9. The COCOM countries are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, The Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
10. The OEA recently published final rules amending the processing times and proce-
dures relating to license reviews by federal agencies and COCOM. See 15 C.F.R. Parts
370.15, 372 and 386 (1985).
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Administrative Amendments Act of 1985 (the "Amendments")"
which reenacts and amends the 1979 Act.12 The Amendments rep-
resent one of the most significant revisions of United States export
control legislation since its introduction following World War II.
Any discussion of export controls involves several contradic-
tory political American policy goals.1 3 There is the goal of open
international trade. Advocates of open trade, among them, export-
ers of high technology products, believe the well-being of the United
States requires a strong export program. In their view, open mar-
kets and a favorable international balance of payments are para-
mount to America's strength. They believe increased commercial
relationships with the traditional enemies of the United States will
result in an amelioration of global tensions.14
There is also the goal of safeguarding the national security.
Advocates of that policy goal believe the most effective way to pro-
tect the national security of the United States is to control the diver-
sion of any commodity or technology that could possibly help the
Soviet Bloc. They believe that all technology, even low technology,
could have some strategic application and that technology once
considered solely "civilian technology" is easily adaptable to mili-
tary use. The advocates of a strong national defense believe the
11. Export Administration Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413).
12. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1979), amended 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1985).
13. See generally, Overview of U.S. International Competitiveness, Hearings before the
Subcomm on International Economic Policy and Trade, H.R. Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
House ofRepresentatives, 97th Congress, (1981-1982) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on
International Competitiveness]; Technology Transfer, Hearings before the Technology Transfer
Panel, H.R. Comm. on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited House
Hearings on Technology Transfer]; Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy, Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings on Reauthorization of 1979 Act]; Export Administration Act, Hearings before the
Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs; 98th Cong., 1st session (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Senate Oversight Hearings on the Act.]; Export Administration Act, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
98th Cong., 1st Session [hereinafter cited as Senate Foreign Relations Hearings]; Enforcement
of the Export Control Administration Act, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Senate Enforce-
ment Hearings.]; H.R. Rep. No. 257, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) and S. Rep. No. 170, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Reports of the 98th Congress.]; and Joint Explana-
tory Statement of the Joint Legislative Conference Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), 131
CONG. REC. H4918 (daily ed. June 25, 1985 [hereinafter cited as Joint Explanatory State-
ment.) [Collectively all the Hearings are referred to as the Hearings.].
14. See Senate Hearings on Reauthorization of the 1979 Act, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983)
(statement of Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary for International Trade, Department of Con-
merce); Senate Oversight Hearings on the Act, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (statement of Lio-
nel Olmer, Under Secretary for International Trade, Department of Commerce).
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United States must make every effort to prevent any diversion of
technology to its adversaries. These advocates lobby for even more
stringent controls. They do not believe the other COCOM member
states have as strong an interest in preventing diversion of goods
and technology to the Soviet Bloc as does the United States. They
would impose even tighter unilateral controls on a wider range of
products.15
There is another political goal, often complementing the strong
security goal. That goal is the ability to influence political friends
and enemies through United States' trade sanctions.16 Proponents
of the use of sanctions through foreign policy export controls, be-
lieve that such controls can be instrumental in bringing about
changes in the the policies of foreign governments. These advocates
are the policy-makers who argued that the 1979 grain embargo and
1980 embargo on natural gas and petroleum equipment exports to
the Soviet Union would be instrumental in forcing the Soviets to
conform their conduct to norms of behavior approved by the
United States or, at least would serve as a symbolic protest against
the Soviet Union's human rights violations.
Exporters find themselves caught between the substantive pol-
icy differences and the bureaucratic rivalries within both Congress
and the Administration. The Congressional Hearings reveal that
among exporters, there is a general consensus as to export policy.
Most agree with the need for multilateral controls of goods and
technology critical to the military. However, they strongly object to
imposing unilateral controls, especially when such controls are im-
posed on products widely available from international sources. As
a group, exporters vehemently object to retroactive controls which
disrupt existing contracts and result in their being considered unre-
liable suppliers. Further, they oppose and object to extraterritorial
controls imposed on their foreign subsidiaries, distributors or
customers. 17
The exporting community is concerned with predictability.
They must have predictability in the licensing process, predictabil-
15. See Senate Hearings on Reauthorization of the 1979 Act supra note 13, at 5 (state-
ments of Senator Jake Garn; Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary for International and Secur-
ity Policy, Department of Defense; William Schneider, Under Secretary for Security
Assistance, Department of State); House Hearings on Technology Transfers, supra note 13,
(statement of Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, Depart-
ment of Defense); Senate Oversight Hearings on the Act (statement of Senator Sam Nunn).
16. See generally, Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export Con-
trols in the 1970's and 1980's, 65 MINN. L. REv. 739 (1981).
17. Id.
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ity in the determination of which commodities and technologies will
be controlled, and predictability in the enforcement of those
controls. The 1979 Act did not provide exporters with the predict-
ability required to establish and sustain international trading
relationships.
A 1983 case which appeared in the record of the Senate Sub-
committee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, 8 illus-
trates the problems faced by exporters under the 1979 Act. It is the
case of Marco Industries, a shipbuilder, headquartered in Seattle.
Marco designs, builds, and supplies hydraulic deck machinery and
outfitting materials to commercial shipping vessels. It both con-
structs completed vessels and licenses the construction of vessels
abroad. Export trade is critical to Marco's economic well-being.
Under the company licensing arrangements, Marco supplies every-
thing required for the construction of a vessel.
In 1971 there was a boom in the commercial shipbuilding in-
dustry. Marco was able to supply the majority of hydraulic deck
machinery and standard marine electronics equipment to foreign
shipbuilders. Until 1983, the Company had no problem exporting
its products under the 1979 Act; the individual components that
made up the shipments were all covered under general licenses.
Not only were the components of little strategic value, they were
widely available in the international market.
On January 27, 1983, Marco learned from its customs broker
that a shipment destined for Italy, worth $250,000, had been de-
tained under "Operation Exodus."19 Marco was under a time con-
straint because its Italian customer's letter of credit was to expire
January 31. The Customs Inspector at the border, unable to resolve
the matter, forwarded the problem to the Customs Control Center
in Washington D.C. On February 3, the customer's letter of credit
expired and Marco was forced to request an extension from its cus-
tomer. On February 7, the Customs Control Center advised Marco
that four of forty-two items in the shipment were still in question
and that the Customs Service needed more information on all items
to complete its review. Marco sent specifications for each product
to Washington along with invoices identifying each item.
After not hearing from the Customs Service within a reason-
18. Senate Hearings on Reauthorization of the 1979 Act, Marco letter by Charles R.
Hart to Senator Gordon at 456.
19. Operation Exodus is a program initiated by the Customs Service in 1981 to prevent
illegal exports of technology by inspecting outbound shipments at U.S. borders and points-of-
entry.
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able time, Marco contacted the Undersecretary of Trade at the In-
ternational Trade Commission (the "ITC"). The ITC referred
Marco to the Commerce Department in Washington, who referred
the Company back to the District Enforcement Branch of Com-
merce in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Office of Export Enforce-
ment (the "OEE") advised Marco that now all forty-two items were
suspect and that the OEE would need additional information from
the company. Ten days later, hearing nothing, Marco called both
the Washington headquarters of OEE and the Customs Service.
Marco was advised by Commerce that a product which had been
exportable under a general license, now required an individual vali-
dated license. Marco was also asked by OEE to send duplicate doc-
umentation because the documentation it had previously sent had
been misplaced.
By February 23, 1983, the date of a Marco letter to Senator
Slade Gordon of Washington regarding the matter, little had been
resolved and the second letter of credit was expiring. Marco stated
to Congress that it anticipated the customer would exercise its only
option available and buy the equipment from other international
sources so that it could complete its contract without incurring any
delay penalties. Marco noted pessimistically that an identical ship-
ment to the same customer was now in serious jeopardy.
A. Historical Abstract
The 1985 Amendments were intended to remedy problems like
those faced by Marco. Debatably, no single piece of legislation in
history gives more power to the President in controlling American
commerce.2" Originally conceived after World War II to avert
shortages of basic commodities, the export control program quickly
became primarily directed towards restricting exports to communist
nations.
By 1950, most exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
had been placed under control. Because of concern with diversion
of U.S. products for reexport to third parties, for example the com-
munist nations, many product exports to other nations were con-
trolled as well. These extensive East/West trade restrictions on a
broad range of commodities were justified on national security
grounds. The Eisenhower administration perceived Soviet domi-
nance in Eastern Europe to be a threat to U.S. interests. American
involvement in the Korean conflict led to an embargo on exports to
20. See generally, Berman and Garson, United States Export Controls - Past, Present
and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1967); Abbott, supra note 16.
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North Korea and the People's Republic of China. President Ken-
nedy embargoed exports to Cuba in 1962; President Johnson em-
bargoed exports to North Vietnam in 1964; and President Ford, to
Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975. The embargo was extended most
recently to Nicaragua and to Libya. With the exception of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, an embargo on all exports to all these na-
tions has been and is now justified on foreign policy grounds, rather
than on the original national security grounds.
The national security rationale for strict export controls be-
came less compelling after Joseph Stalin's death. Western Europe
took advantage of the more relaxed political climate and expanded
its trade with the Soviet Union and the East European countries.
The United States did not relax its controls during the 1960's.
Under President Nixon's policy of detente, U.S. trading with
the East expanded and Commerce began to dismantle American
unilateral controls. The dismantling accelerated during the 1970's
under the Export Administration Act of 1969 (the "1969 Act").2 '
The American controls now more closely corresponded with con-
trols imposed by other major Western nations. American controls
were primarily national security controls of dual use technology.
Foreign policy controls were not used extensively.
In fact until the late 1970's, foreign policy controls were lim-
ited to embargoes, controls to implement United Nation's actions,
controls restricting export nuclear items and controls aimed at pre-
serving international stability and fighting terrorism.2 2
By 1977 and 1978, United States-Soviet relations had improved
considerably and the world economy was changing. The United
States no longer claimed a monopoly on high technology. High
technology goods were being imported into the United States and
U.S. sellers had to look abroad to open new markets. Business
found that the export controls imposed under the 1969 Act were
cumbersome and unfairly and unevenly administered. They com-
plained that in some instances controls were unnecessary because
many of our trading partners were able to secure equivalent goods
and technology from foreign sources. The 1979 Act was intended
to be responsive to the concerns of the Defense Department, the
State Department and the business community.2 3
However, between 1979 and 1982 when Congress took up
21. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413).
22. See generally, Abbott, supra note 16, at 756-63; Berman and Garson, supra note 20.
23. See supra note 13.
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reauthorization, the climate surrounding export policy had changed
dramatically. President Reagan came into office with a strong anti-
Communist bias. Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense,
dedicated himself to strengthening the U.S. armed forces and
preventing the diversion of any technology which could be broadly
defined as "strategic." There was also evidence that the Soviets had
engaged in an extensive military build-up and posed a greater threat
to U.S. security than they had in 1979. Secretary Weinberger and
Assistant Secretary Richard Perle insisted that there was a "hemor-
rhage" of United States technology and that this leakage had ena-
bled the Soviet Union to accelerate its weapons build-up by at least
ten years. 24
Simultaneous with an American weapons build-up by Secre-
tary Weinberger, a world-wide and domestic recession increased
business' need for a consistent export policy. Without a consistent
policy, the exporters argued they could not develop new markets or
maintain established trading relationships. President Carter's grain
embargo and President Reagan's gas and petroleum pipeline em-
bargo had done considerable damage to the reputations of Ameri-
can exporters. They were considered unreliable suppliers who were
subject to licensing delays at best, and non-performance at worst.25
The 1979 Act had attempted to strike a compromise between
the demands for increased protection of United States national se-
curity, the ability to use trade leverage in the conduct of foreign
policy and predictability in the export licensing process. Clearly
something more was needed.
Congress debated the export controls legislation for two-and-a-
half years. It heard testimony from the Defense, Commerce, and
State Departments; the Customs Service; and from the business and
the academic communities. As in 1979, Congress was faced with
reconciling conflicting political goals and deep philosophical differ-
ences.26 While there was a near compromise in the 98th Congress,
Congressional leaders failed to reach agreement on the extension by
the end of the session. Jurisdictional, political and regulatory policy
differences still divided both the House and the Senate. The Act
expired, but its controls were extended under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act.27
24. See supra note 13.
25. See generally The Hearings, supra note 13.
26. See Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 13.
27. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1984). The first extension of the 1979 Act under the
IEEPA was promulgated on October 14, 1983, by Executive Order No. 12444, 48 Fed Reg.
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The 99th Congress wanted to avoid repetition of the bitter bat-
tles of the 98th Congress and so the renewal bill embodied the com-
promise reached in 1984. The bill28 was accompanied by a full
report and a Joint Explanatory Statement. It was signed into law
by President Reagan on July 12, 1985.29
After two-and-a-half years of debate, Congress finally had
forged what it considered to be a reconciliation of the differing
points of view. According to its authors, the goals of the Amend-
ments are: (1) to reduce the number of goods and technologies sub-
ject to export controls; (2) to increase and improve the security of
any foreign sale of our most sophisticated and militarily critical
technology; (3) to improve the efficiency of the exporting process so
as not to unduly handicap our exporters' ability to be competitive;
and (4) to establish a set of criteria and procedural requirements to
govern the use of foreign policy controls. The Conference Commit-
tee Report states that the Amendments attempt to meet these goals
in four ways: (1) By strengthening national security controls; (2) by
restricting the President's authority to impose foreign controls; (3)
by streamlining the exporting process; (4) and by beefing up and
improving the efficiency of enforcement efforts.30 The following
discussion highlights the significant changes from the 1979 Act.
B. National Security Controls31
The Amendments require the Secretaries of Defense and Com-
merce to consult each other on export policy and to integrate items
on the List of Militarily Critical Technologies into the Control List
(formally called the Commodities Control List). The Control List
is to be reviewed annually and the annual reviews must include a
review of at least one-third of the COCOM list. Commerce and
Defense are advised to reduce the number of items on the list.32
The foreign availability provisions of the National Security
Controls represent a significant improvement to the 1979 Act. The
amendments shift the burden of proof from the exporter to the
Commerce Department and require Commerce to prove a product
is not available internationally. They also require the Secretary to
48215; the second extension was promulgated on March 30, 1984 by Executive Order No.
12470, 49 Fed. Reg. 13099.
28. Reported out of Congress as H.R. 1786.
29. See supra note 2.
30. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 13.
31. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1985).
32. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(5) (1985). The Control List appears at 15 C.F.R. Part 399
of the Regulations (1986).
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establish an Office of Foreign Availability and to negotiate with for-
eign governments to eliminate foreign availability of controlled
commodities.33
In the near future it is unlikely that the foreign availability pro-
visions will afford much relief to U.S. exporters. The test of foreign
availability is whether a commodity is available-in-fact in a con-
trolled country in both comparable quality and comparable quanti-
ties so as to make unilateral U.S. expert controls meaningless.34
Foreign availability procedures do not apply to West/East transac-
tions. That is, a U.S. exporter cannot look to a Western country
such as the United Kingdom or Japan to show a comparable con-
trolled product is available internationally. Presumably, that con-
trolled product is not "available" because it is controlled by
COCOM. The comparable product in comparable quantities must
be available in a non-Western country.3
The penalties for violations of national security export controls
were made more severe. Under the Act, it is a criminal offense to
intentionally evade the national security controls. If convicted, a
panoply of criminal sanctions may be imposed against the violator.
Those sanctions include the following:
1. A business can be liable for five times the value of the export
or one million dollars, whichever is greater;
2. An individual can be liable for criminal fines of up to
$250,000 or ten years imprisonment or both;
3. Both the business and the exporter can be denied export
privileges;
4. They can each be liable for a civil penalty of up to
$100,000; and
5. The illegally exported goods will probably be seized.36
The Amendments also add import restrictions against foreign
violators of U.S. export controls. A foreign company, not subject to
U.S. jurisdiction, which willfully violates the national security ex-
port controls can be barred from importing its goods into the
United States.37
At the same time, the Amendment tries to reconcile academic
freedom and national security. It states that in traditional academic
33. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f) (1985).
34. 15 C.F.R. Part 391 (1986).
35. A non-Western country means a country other than a COCOM country or a coun-
try with a bilateral control agreement with the United States.
36. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1985).
37. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1863, repealed by Act Jan. 3,
1975, P.L. 93-618, Title IV, § 602(d), 88 Stat. 2072, §§ 1862, 1863 (1962).
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scientific activities, those involving universities engaged in scientific
research, scholars should be free from restriction with respect to
their exchanges in the open classroom and conferences unless a sci-
entific question is subject to security classification.38
C. Foreign Policy Controls39
In order to promote foreign policy objectives, the Act gives the
President the power to impose controls on the export of goods and
technology to certain target countries which are not otherwise sub-
ject to export controls because of national security reasons. The
Amendments make significant changes to the President's ability to
impose such foreign policy controls.
As discussed above, the reputations of American exporters has
been severely damaged by previous embargoes. One of the most
hotly contested issues in the debate over the extension of the 1979
Act was whether the President's authority extended far enough to
require the breaking of existing contracts and licenses. Many in
Congress wanted to avoid any retroactive application of foreign pol-
icy export controls on American companies.40 The Amendments
add a "contract sanctity" provision which removes the President's
authority to terminate existing contracts for foreign policy reasons
unless the President certifies to Congress that a breach of the peace
poses a serious and direct threat to the strategic interests of the
United States. He must also certify that the curtailment of existing
contracts will be instrumental in remedying the situation, and the
United States can enforce the controls. Such foreign policy controls
can remain in effect only so long as the direct threat continues to
exist.41
The Amendments significantly tighten the criteria the Presi-
dent must meet in order to impose foreign policy controls. Sanc-
tions can only be used after all other channels of diplomacy have
been tried and the President has conducted an analysis of the prob-
able costs and benefits involved in imposing controls. Six months
after the date the foreign policy controls are imposed, the Secretary
of Commerce must determine whether there is foreign availability
of any controlled product. If the Secretary determines that any
38. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1985). See discussion of Technical Data and Software, infra,
at pp. 122-23.
39. 50 U.S.C. § 2405 (1985).
40. See generally, Senate Hearings on Reauthorization of.1979 Act; Senate Foreign Rela.
tions Hearings; Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 13.
41. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (1985).
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commodity or technology is available internationally, he must re-
move the commodity or technology from the Control List.42
One important foreign policy control involves doing business
with or in South Africa. The Amendments reimposed certain prior
export controls on South Africa for a renewable one year period.43
On November 18, 1985, the Department of Commerce issued final
rules regarding trade and other transactions with South Africa.'
These rules require a validated export license for all exports to
South African military and police entities even though the export
could be made under a general license to other parties in South
Africa.
D. Streamlining the Exporting Process
The Amendments mandate that the export application review
process be streamlined. They do this by decontrolling products
which were restricted solely because they contained microproces-
sors.45 In this way, Congress estimated that it eliminated the need
for some forty percent of the volume of export licenses required
prior to the Act.46
The Amendments mandate a fifteen-day license processing
time for certain relatively low technology exports destined to
COCOM countries. 7 It gives these privileges to non-COCOM
countries who agree to control commodities and technologies in the
same manner as COCOM.
4 8
The Amendments also reduce application review processing
times by as much as one-third.49 Unfortunately for exporters, no
additional funds were allocated to expand the Office of Export Ad-
ministration staff and, in light of budgetary constraints, it is highly
unlikely the OEA and the other reviewing agencies will be able to
meet the time constraints. Neither OEA nor Defense is currently
meeting their respective deadlines.
The Amendments encourage the use of special licenses author-
izing multiple exports for "reliable" exporters and their customers.
Also added is a new special license, the Comprehensive Operations
42. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(h) (1985).
43. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(n) (1985).
44. 15 C.F.R. Parts 371, 373, 379, 385, 386, and 399 (1985).
45. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(m) (1985).
46. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 13.
47. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(o) (1985).
48. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(k) (1985).
49. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409 (1985).
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License. ° This license is intended to better regulate technology ex-
changes and to facilitate cooperative innovation and the transfer of
know-how among affiliated companies including subcontractors and
suppliers of the international operations of U.S. exporters and joint
venturers.
5 1
E. Enforcement52
The Amendments expand the enforcement provisions of the
Act and impose tougher penalties on those violators of the national
security and foreign policy controls. They add enforcement powers
and clarify the responsibilities of the Customs Service and the De-
partment of Commerce. (See the discussion of Enforcement in Sec-
tion IX, infra at p.132.) The question is whether Customs and
Commerce can truly work together in their enforcement efforts.
IV. EXPORT CONTROLS ON COMPUTERS AND COMPUTER
SOFTWARE
Pursuant to Section 5(i) of the Act (National Security Con-
trols), the United States entered into certain agreements with
COCOM members to establish a uniform policy on export control.
The Amendments require further cooperation with COCOM to
more effectively deter diversions of controlled items.5 The OEA is
charged with the responsibility of implementing the international
agreements. On December 31, 1984, without public comment,
OEA published its final rules implementing certain COCOM agree-
ments (the "December Amendments").5 4  These December
Amendments: (1) decontrolled certain low-level computers, certain
"embedded" or "incorporated" computers and certain low-level pe-
ripheral equipment; (2) raised the level of controls on more power-
ful commercial computers and imposed stricter controls on
compact, "ruggedized" computers,55 super minicomputers and
other more sophisticated computer-related products; (3) imposed
significantly more controls on all categories of software; and (4) es-
tablished definitions to assist exporters in interpreting and applying
50. 50 U.S.C. app. 2403(a)(2)(B) (1985).
51. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra, note 13.
52. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411 (1985).
53. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(9), (14) (1985).
54. See 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1985). These computer and computer-related controls are
listed in CL Number ECCN 1565A. See also, 51 Fed. Reg. 1493 (1986) conforming 15
C.F.R. § 376.10 to ECCN 1565A.
55. "Ruggedized" computers are computers built for military combat situations.
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the export control rules as those rules relate to computers.5 6
The December Amendments also established a separate con-
trol category for stored program controlled communication switch-
ing equipment and related software.
5 7
The December Amendments were met with such stormy pro-
test from industry that on April 26, 1985, the OEA published new
rules (the "April Amendments"). 58 The April Amendments com-
pletely revised the December Amendments as those rules related to
computer software and clarified the scope of the rules relating to
controls on "embedded" computers and related peripherals.5 9
Under the April Amendments, most unbundled software does not
need a validated license but may be exported to Country Groups T
and V under a General License GTDR, while certain other software
requires a validated license. Certain software which can be ex-
ported under a General License GTDR requires "written assur-
ances" from the consignee that the software will not be reexported
to a controlled destination without a validated license. (See the dis-
cussion on Technical Data and Software in Section V.A.2., infra at
p. 122.)
V. EXPORT LICENSING
To enforce its controls, the Act mandates an export licensing
system. All exports from the United States of any commodity or
technical data must be authorized under either a general license or a
validated license issued by the Department of Commerce or another
government agency.
A general license comes into being by operation law.60 It is a
certification given by an exporter clearly identifying on the Ship-
per's Export Declaration that the export falls within one of the gen-
eral license categories and that a validated license is not required.61
No application is required and the OEA does not issue a docu-
ment.62
56. See supra note 54.
57. See 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1985). Stored program controlled communication switching
equipment and related software listed in CL Number ECCN 1567A.
58. 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4, Supplement 3 to Parts 379 and 399 (1985).
59. For an excellent discussion of the December Amendments and the April Amend-
ments, respectively, see, McKenzie, Changes in Export Controls on Computers and Software, 2
THE COMPUTER LAWYER 1, 28 (January 1985); and McKenzie, Recent Developments in
Contracts [sic] on Software Exports, 2 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 5 (May 1985).
60. 15 C.F.R. § 371.1 (1986).
61. 15 C.F.R. § 371.2 (1986).
62. 15 C.F.R. § 371.1 (1986).
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A validated export license is a formal authorization issued by
the OEA. It permits the exporter to ship a specific amount of a
particular commodity to a specific consignee in a country for a des-
ignated use.
A. General License
There are a number of different general licenses. Following is a
discussion of some of the more widely used general licenses.
1. Commodities
a. General License G-DEST63
The majority of exports are shipped under a General License
G-DEST (General Destination). A General License G-DEST au-
thorizes shipments of any commodity listed on the Control List to
any destination for which a validated license is not required.
b. General License GL V14
A General License GLV (Shipments of Limited Value) autho-
rizes the export of a single order of a controlled commodity when
the commodity is normally shipped pursuant to a validated license
but the total order amount is valued within the GLV dollar value
limit specified on the CL. The value of the order, not the shipment
value, determines the authorization. Shippers may not split an or-
der to create shipments which would fall within the GLV dollar
limit.
c. General License GLR65
General License GLR (Return or Replacement of Certain
Commodities) covers the return or replacement of certain commod-
ities from countries which imported them. A General License GLR
is limited to four types of return situations: (1) it enables exporters
to export commodities sent to the United States for servicing which
consists of inspection, testing, calibration, repair, including over-
haul and reconditioning; (2) it allows an exporter to return un-
wanted foreign origin commodities as long as those commodities
were not enhanced while in the United States (however, goods may
not be returned to Country Groups S or Z); (3) it allows shipments
63. 15 C.F.R. § 371.3 (1986).
64. 15 C.F.R. § 371.5 (1986).
65. 15 C.F.R. § 371.17 (1986).
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of commodities refused entry into the United States to be returned
to any country except Country Group S and Z;66 and (4) it allows
an exporter to replace defective or unacceptable U.S.-origin con-
trolled parts or equipment to a country in all Country Groups ex-
cept Group S and Z. This last category is intended to cover
products which are under warranty. A General License GLR may
not be used to replace controlled parts or equipment which are
worn through normal use and service.67
d. General License GTE6"
General license GTE (Temporary Exports) authorizes the tem-
porary shipment of commodities for a period of up to one year.
This General License is particularly important to sales representa-
tives, distributors and others who want to exhibit U.S.-origin prod-
ucts abroad. Unlike the other general licenses, General License
GTE requires the exporter to request a written registration from
OEA.69
The following types of shipments may be exported under the
General License GTE: (1) the usual and reasonable kinds and
quantities of commodities for use by the exporter or his representa-
tive in an enterprise or undertaking of the exporter approved by the
OEA; (2) commodities for exhibition or demonstration in Country
Group T or V providing the United States exporter retains title; (3)
commodities to be inspected, tested, calibrated or repaired abroad;
(4) certain containers; (5) video tapes; and (6) commodities to be
exported to Mexico and returned to the United States under U.S.
Customs offshore manufacturing program.7°
As stated above, exports made under the General License GTE
must be returned to the U.S. within one year of the date of export.
In the event the export is exported under General License GTE
with the intent to sell or otherwise dispose of the commodity abroad
and it is not practical to return the item to the U.S., the exporter
may retain the commodity abroad and apply for a validated
license.71
66. 15 C.F.R. § 371.17(d) (1986).
67. 15 C.F.R. § 371.17(f)(i) (1986).
68. 15 C.F.R. § 371.22 (1986).
69. 15 C.F.R. § 371.22(b) (1986).
70. 15 C.F.R. § 371.22(e) (1986).
71. 15 C.F.R. § 371.22(e) (1986).
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e. General License G-COM72
The Amendments authorize a new General License G-COM
(COCOM). The regulations, published September 23, 1985, au-
thorize the export of certain eligible controlled commodities to and
between COCOM countries without a validated license. The com-
modities permitted to be exported under General License G-COM
are listed in the CL under the paragraph "Special Licenses Avail-
able". Eligibility for G-COM is based on the destination (COCOM
Country) and the technical performance characteristics of a given
commodity, not its intended end-use.
f Proposed General License G-CEU73
On June 23, 1986, OEA proposed a new general license which
would permit pre-certified foreign parties ("Certified End-Users")
to receive exports of certain restricted commodities which would,
under other circumstances, require a validated license. The Depart-
ment has solicited comments.
2. Technical Data and Software
All "technical data," defined as information, know-how, assist-
ance or service, specifications and training, that can be used, or
adapted for use in the designing, production, manufacture, utiliza-
tion, or reconstruction of articles or materials, is controlled. The
data may take a tangible form such as a model, prototype, blueprint
or operating manual; or they may take an intangible form such as
technical service.74 All software is technical data.75
An "export of technical data" means (1) an actual shipment or
transmission of technical data outside the United States; (2) any re-
lease of technical data in the United States with the knowledge or
intent that the data will be exported; and (3) any release of U.S.-
origin technical data in a foreign country.76
Technical data may be released in a number of ways. For ex-
ample, the training of foreign nationals is an export, as is the visual
inspection of U.S. origin plants, equipment and facilities in foreign
nations. Technical data may be released by oral exchanges either in
the United States or abroad, or by providing technical knowledge or
72. 15 C.F.R. Parts 371, 374, 386, and 399 (1985).
73. 51 Fed. Reg. 22826 (1986).
74. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1 (1986).
75. Software is controlled pursuant to 15 C.F.R. Parts 379 and 399. The media may be
controlled by ECCN 1572A of 15 C.F.R. § 399.1.
76. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1 (1986).
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experience abroad, which has been acquired in the United States.
Reexports of technical data are also controlled. A reexport of tech-
nical data occurs when technical data is "released" in a foreign
country with the knowledge or intent that the data will be exported
to another foreign country. Under this definition, inspection of a
U.S. facility, plant or equipment in a foreign country is considered a
reexport.
On May 16, 1986, OEA published proposed rules relating to
the transfer of technical data.7 7 Among other things, the proposed
regulations would amend the rules relating to the release of con-
trolled technical data to resident foreign nationals employed by
American companies or universities. The proposed rules would al-
low technical data otherwise exportable only under an individual
validated license to be released under a general license to a qualify-
ing foreign national employee.78
Part 379 of the Regulations establishes two General Licenses
for technical data and identifies the technical data for which a vali-
dated license is required.
a. General License GTDA79
A General License GTDA (Data Generally Available) is a
general license which authorizes shipment of qualifying technical
data to all destinations. Authorized technical data under General
License GTDA is data that is generally available. For example,
data released at conferences, lectures, trade shows and other media
open to the public, as well as publications that may be purchased at
nominal cost or are readily available at public libraries. Also, scien-
tific or education data not directly and significantly related to the
design, production or utilization in industrial processes, and data
77. 51 Fed. Reg. 17986 (1986) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. Part 379) (proposed May 16,
1986).
78. The proposed conditions are:
(i) The foreign person is a bona fide and full-time regular employee, or appro-
priate action has been initiated under the Immigration and Naturalization Act
that is intended to result in the foreign person becoming a full-time regular
employee;
(ii) The employee resides throughout the period of employment in the United
States;
(iii) The employee is not a national of a country listed in country groups Q, S,
W, Y, Z, Afghanistan or the Peoples Republic of China;
(iv) The technical data are not restricted by either § 379.4(c) or (e); and
(v) The employer has been assured by the employee in writing that the techni-
cal data will not be transferred to other foreign persons, without the written
consent of the OEA. A
79. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3 (1986).
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from patent applications, may be exported to any destination under
a General License GTDA.
Current General License GTDA regulations provide for three
categories of eligible technical data: (1) data generally available to
the public; (2) scientific or educational data; and (3) information
contained in patent applications.80 The OEA has had difficulty over
the years applying these three categories. "Data generally avail-
able" included publications available at nominal cost. While the
"nominal cost" test did often indicate general availability, it was a
difficult and arbitrary test and OEA's licensing determinations were
often unduly restrictive. The transfer of data in a scientific confer-
ence is presently permitted under General License GTDA if the
conference is "open." However, OEA has had difficulty determin-
ing precisely how to define the criteria for research which qualified
as scientific or educational data.
The proposed regulations redefine the categories. To qualify
for General License GTDA, technical data must either be: (1) pub-
licly available; (2) fundamental research; (3) educational informa-
tion; or (4) a patent.81 The May 16 rules propose to define
"publicly available" and "fundamental research." Publicly avail-
able information is information available to a community of persons
such as persons who share a scientific or engineering discipline.
Under the proposed Regulations, most mass marketing software
would be considered publicly available and could be exported under
a General License GTDA. Fundamental research is defined in
terms of degree of control imposed of the dissemination of the data
and the entity performing the research. Research conducted at a
university which is research neither contractually controlled nor
classified, would be deemed fundamental research, while proprie-
tary research conducted by a business would be fundamental, only
if the information could be freely disclosed.
b. General License GTDR82
The General License GTDR (General License under Restric-
tion) authorizes the export of most proprietary technical data to
free world destinations. There are special restrictions on exports
under General License GTDR to Country Groups Q, W, Y, S and
Z as well as to the People's Republic of China, Afghanistan, the
80. Id.
81. See supra note 77.
82. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4 (1986).
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Republic of South Africa and Namibia.83
There are other restrictions and those restrictions relate to cer-
tain commodities which may only be exported under a validated
license. Primarily, commodities involved in the design, production
or testing of nuclear weapons and civil aircraft, and related aircraft
and instruments related to similar aircraft.84 There are also special
limitations on the use of General License GTDR for technical data
on crime control and detection instruments and equipment.85 In
addition, technical data may not be shipped General License
GTDR if such technical data is specifically related to or listed as an
entry on the CL.86
(i) Written Assurances Requirements
Part 379.4(f) of the Regulations requires that before an ex-
porter may ship certain data, services, materials or software under
General License GTDR, he must receive written assurances from
the importer that neither the technical data nor the direct product8 7
is intended to be shipped, either directly or indirectly, to Country
Group Q, S, W, Y or Z or Afghanistan, or the People's Republic of
China without a validated license. The written assurances from the
prospective importer of the technical data may be either in the form
of a letter or in a clause of a license agreement or other contract.88
The assurances must commit the importer, in writing, to restrict the
disposition of the technical data and or the direct product of the
data. A sample "written assurances clause" is attached as Appen-
dix B. In the event the exporter does not receive the written assur-
ances prior to shipment, the exporter will require a validated
license.8 9
(ii) Software as Technical Data
The April Amendments, supra, established a hierarchy of con-
trols on software exports.90 A validated license is required for ex-
ports of all software covered by Parts 379.4(c) and 379.4(d) of the
83. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4 (1986).
84. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(c), (d) (1986).
85. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(e) (1986).
86. For example, for software, such entries would include ECCN Numbers 1091A,
1354A, 1355A, 1527A, 1532A, 1567A, listed in 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1986).
87. "Direct product" means the immediate product (including processing and services)
produced directly by use of the technical data. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f) n.1 (1986).
88. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f) (1986).
89. Id.
90. 15 C.F.R. Part 379 (Supp. 3 1985) and 15 C.F.R. Part 399 (1985).
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Regulations and all software controlled under a CL entry. Software
that COCOM has agreed to control is at the next level of control.
This software is listed in Supplement 3 to Part 379 and requires
written assurances from the consignee. Finally, all other proprie-
tary software may be exported under a General License GTDR.9t
B. Validated Licenses
A validated license, issued by OEA, is based on an Application
for Export License (Form IT-622P). It authorizes the export of a
specific commodity to a specific destination or destinations at a spe-
cific dollar amount of shipment. Approval of the application is
based on the following considerations: (1) the reason for the control
(i.e. national security, foreign policy, short supply); (2) the type of
commodity; (3) the ultimate destination; (4) the dollar value; (5) the
intended use; (6) whether the commodity has other potential uses
and what those uses are; (7) whether the circumstances suggest the
possibility of a diversion to an unauthorized destination; and (8)
whether the goods or technical data are available from other coun-
tries.92 It is important to note that the OEA will not accept an
application without evidence that the exporter has a valid order for
the goods and93 technical data.
There are currently six types of validated licenses:
1. Individual Licenses
a. Individual Validated Licenses94
The most widely used validated license is the individual vali-
dated license. It authorizes the export of technical data for a speci-
fied quantity of a specified commodity to a designated consignee in
a designated country for a specified period of time (usually one
year). The license is renewable and must be returned to the OEA if
it is revoked, suspended, revised or unused.
91. Id.
92. Under the foreign availability provisions of the Amendments, the OEA is required
to give more favorable consideration to exports of items that can be obtained from foreign
sources in comparable quantities and comparable quality as United States denial of export
privileges would be ineffective in achieving its intended result.
93. 15 C.F.R. Part 372 (1986).
94. 15 C.F.R. § 373.2 (1986).
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2. Special Multiple Licenses
a. A Project License9"
A Project License authorizes the export of commodities (and
technical data where specifically authorized) required for a specified
activity for a period of approximately one year from the issuance of
the license. An extension of a Project License may be valid up to
two years. This license is used in connection with a substantial pro-
ject, construction or expansion of a facility or the supply of material
for maintenance, repair or operation or production of other com-
modities and is approved when there is a reasonable expectation
that if granted, the Project License will replace at least twenty-five
individual validated licenses.
b. Distribution License96
On May 24, 1985, the OEA issued final rules substantially
changing the procedures relating to Distribution Licenses. The Dis-
tribution License authorizes the export of certain commodities to
approved distributors and end-users under an international market-
ing program to Country Groups T and V, except the People's Re-
public of China, Iran and Afghanistan. The Distribution License is
valid for two years and may be extended once by amendment for a
two year period. Thereafter, a new application may be approved for
a four-year period.
OEA has been seeking ways to improve the monitoring and
control of the Distribution License program without creating un-
necessary roadblocks for the United States exporters. The new
rules establish more stringent eligibility requirements for licensed
applicants by imposing additional internal controls over consignee
and license-holder activities, including the screening of customers.
The rules require that top management of firms with Distribution
Licenses be responsible for assuring compliance and maintaining
the quality of the control program. The OEA intends to hold top
management accountable for compliance by requiring the Distribu-
tion License holder to be responsible for advising consignees of the
regulatory restrictions of the Distribution License procedure.97 Li-
cense holders and their consignees must know their customers as
well as the Regulations. The new procedures also impose new re-
95. 15 C.F.R. § 373.3 (1986).
96. Id.
97. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a)(2)(B) (1985). As of the date of this writing, OEA has not
published implementing regulations.
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quirements for controls on drop shipments, in transit shipments and
sales to authorize reexport territories.
The OEA has stated that the Distribution License is a special
privilege that provides companies with significant flexibility to make
shipments without obtaining individual validated licenses. In turn,
the OEA requires strict compliance by license holders and their ap-
proved consignees.
c. Comprehensive Operations License9"
The Amendments establish a new Comprehensive Operations
License which authorizes exports and reexports of controlled goods
and technology from the United States to and among foreign sub-
sidiaries, affiliates, joint venturers and licensees that have (1) long-
term, contractually defined relations with the exporter, (2) are lo-
cated in countries other than controlled countries and (3) have been
approved by the OEA. The OEA may grant the license to manufac-
turing, laboratory or related operations on the basis of the ex-
porter's internal compliance program, including proprietary
controls, applicable to the technology and related goods to be
exported.
d. Service Supply Procedure99
A Service Supply Procedure ("SL") is established to enable
U.S. companies and persons to provide prompt service for equip-
ment exported from the United States. Under a SL, the U.S. ex-
porter or manufacturer may export spare and replacement parts to
Country Group T or V (and, in more limited degree only replace-
ment parts to Country Groups Q, W and Y, Afghanistan and the
People's Republic of China) subject to certain restrictions. Three
types of export and reexport authorizations are obtainable: (a) ex-
ports from the United States; (b) reexports by a foreign-based ser-
vice facility in Country Groups T and V (except Afghanistan and
the People's Republic of China), to any other destination in Coun-
try Group T or V (except Afghanistan and the People's Republic of
China), to any other destination in Country Group T or V (except
Afghanistan and the People's Republic of China), to service U.S.
equipment unless the consignee is listed in the Table of Denials Or-
ders. " Under certain circumstances, a service facility located in
98. 15 C.F.R. § 373.7 (1986).
99. The Table of Denial Orders is a list published by the OEA on those person and
firms denied export privileges. See 15 C.F.R. Part 388 (Supp. 1 1982).
100. 15 C.F.R. § 373.7 (1986).
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Country Group T or V (except Afghanistan), that is under the effec-
tive control of the U.S. exporter may be authorized to reexport,
upon specific instructions of the U.S. exporter, replacement parts
for the immediate repair of U.S. equipment in Country Group Q, W
and Y, Afghanistan or the People's Republic of China; and (c) reex-
ports by foreign manufacturers in Country Group T or V (except
Afghanistan), who incorporated U.S.-origin parts into their prod-
ucts for reexport of spare or replacement parts to consignees in
Country Group T or V (except Afghanistan), as long as such con-
signees are not listed in the Table of Denial Orders.101
3. Determining Licenseability
As stated above, a validated license is required for the export of
all products listed on the CL. To determine whether or not a par-
ticular commodity requires a validated license, the exporter locates
the commodity description, then locates the export control number
("ECCN"). This is a four-digit number followed by a code letter.
A code "A" means the commodity is subject to multilateral control
(COCOM review) to all destinations. A code "B" means it is sub-
ject only to United States' unilateral control.
Below the commodity description and the ECCN are the con-
trols. They include:
(a) Unit - Indicates how to describe units in the license
application.
(b) Validated License Required - Indicates by Country Group
the destinations which require a validated license. If the in-
tended destination is not listed, the commodity is not controlled
and the transaction cannot qualify for another general license,
the commodity may go to General License G-DEST.
(c) GLV Value Limit: Indicates the dollar limit for making
shipments of controlled commodities under General License
GLV. The GLV limit applies to the value of the order, not the
shipment; shipments may not be split.
(d) Processing Code - This is a two letter code that
designates the OEA licensing office that will process the appli-
cation. While different ECCN numbers may be placed on the
same license application, processing codes must not be mixed on
an application.
(e) Reasons for Control - This designates the reason for con-
trol, i.e. national security, short supply, foreign policy, nuclear
non-proliferation, or crime control
101. See 15 C.F.R. Parts 372, 375 and 386 (1985).
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(f) Special Licenses Available - This highlights any limita-
tions on the use of multiple licenses.
Following this information is a description of the characteris-
tics of those products which may be licensed (e.g., make and model
number number, parts and accessories, etc.), as well as the excep-
tions. The listing also contains "Advisory Notes" which are OEA
policy statements.
Part 376 of the Regulations addresses special commodity poli-
cies and provisions and Part 385 addresses special country polices
and provisions. Each should be consulted prior to exporting be-
cause they may impose additional restrictions on the planned
export.
In the event a validated license is required, the exporter must
fill out the proper application form and supporting documenta-
tion. 102 Even if a validated license is not required, in most cases the
exporter will be required to prepare a Shipper's Export Declaration
prior to shipping.
VI. REEXPORTS
Pursuant to Part 370.2, a "reexport" includes the reexport,
transshipment of diversion of commodities and technical data from
one foreign destination to another. Under this definition, if the end-
use or end-user changes, there will be a reexport. Thus, a reexport
can include a transfer of goods or technical data between countries
or within the same country. Reexports of controlled commodities
or technical data are themselves controlled.
An exporter who plans to reexport the commodity prior to
shipping, can request reexport authorization on the validated li-
cense application. If, after delivery, the ultimate consignee decides
to reexport the commodity to a new consignee, the consignee must
obtain OEA reexport approval. Certain types of reexports are con-
sidered "permissive reexports" and may be made without obtaining
prior OEA approval.'0 3 For example, a commodity may be reex-
ported to a destination to which direct shipment is authorized
under an unused outstanding validated license."o
Special rules apply to reexports of commodities made under a
General License GLR (General License Repair)' 05 for the replace-
ment of defective or unacceptable U.S.-origin product. To reexport
102. See 15 C.F.R. § 374.2 (1986).
103. Id.
104. See 15 C.F.R. § 371.17 (1986).
105. See 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 (1986).
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replacement products under a General License GLR to Country
Groups Q, W or Y, the exporter must ensure and so certify that the
replaced product will be destroyed or replaced.
Reexports to and from COCOM countries and Canada receive
special consideration
A reexport of technical data, is subject to the same controls
imposed upon its export from the United States. That is, its reex-
port is controlled unless it falls within the "permissive reexport"
classification of Part 379.8(b). three types of permissive reexports
of technical data: (1) technical data which at the time of export
could have been shipped directly from the United States to the new
destination under a General License GTDA or General License
GTDR; (2) technical data such as manuals, blueprints, etc., reex-
ported to Country Groups Q, W, Y, or Afghanistan, where the ex-
porter has a validated license and the reexport is made as part of the
same transaction, and (3) the reexport has specific COCOM
authorization.
VII. SPARE PARTS, COMPONENTS AND MATERIALS IN
FOREIGN-MADE END PRODUCTS
Parts, components, materials or other commodities exported
from the United States and used abroad to manufacture or produce
a foreign-made end product are subject to the export control
laws.10 6 In order to determine whether a validated license is re-
quired for the export from a foreign country of foreign-made end
product containing U.S. origin parts or components, the Regula-
tions set up a three-part test.
0 7
VIII. RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND ANTIBOYCOTT
PROVISIONS
In the early 1970's the Arab countries put increasing pressure
on its suppliers and customers to boycott Israel. The Arab league
recommended that companies and persons making a "material con-
tribution" to Israel be blacklisted and boycotted. Firms were fur-
ther pressured not to use goods or services produced by Israel or
other blacklisted persons or firms. Congress responded to the in-
creasing Arab pressure by prohibiting American companies from
participating in the boycott.10 8 Section 2407 of the Act and the im-
106. 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 note.
107. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1979).
108. 15 C.F.R. Part 369 (1986).
1987]
COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
plementing Regulations" 9 set out the rules regarding the prohibi-
tions and the rigorous reporting requirements. The following are
prohibited under the Act:110
(a) Refusing or requiring any person to refuse to do business
with or in the boycotted country or with any business organized
under the laws of the boycotted country or with any national or
resident of the boycotted country or with any other person pur-
suant to an agreement with, or requirement or request from, or
on behalf of, the boycotting country.
(b) Refusing or requiring any other person to refuse to employ
or otherwise discriminate against any United States person on
the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin.
(c) Furnishing information with respect to the race, religion, sex
or national origin of any United States person.
(d) Furnishing information about business relationships with
boycotted countries or blacklisted persons.
(e) Furnishing any information about any person's associations
with charitable or fraternal organizations which support the boy-
cotted country.
(f) Paying, honoring, confirming or implementing a letter of
credit which contains a condition or requirement compliance of
which is prohibited by the Regulations.
The Regulations provide for seven basic exceptions. 11
(a) Compliance with the import requirements of the boycotting
country;
(b) Compliance with the shipping requirements of a boycotting
country;
(c) Compliance with the import and shipping document require-
ments of a boycotting country;
(d) Compliance with the unilateral or specific selection require-
ments of a boycotting country;
(e) Compliance with the export requirements of a boycotting
country relating to transshipments of exports to a boycotted
country;
(f) Compliance with immigration, passport or employment re-
quirements of a boycotting country; and
(g) Compliance with local law with respect to activities exclu-
sively within the boycotting country.
The antiboycotting prohibitions apply to all United States per-
sons and all transactions in United States commerce. The penalties
109. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1979).
110. 15 C.F.R. Part 369 (1986).
111. 26 U.S.C. § 999 (1984).
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for violation are severe. Violations of the antiboycott regulations,
including failure to report boycott requests pursuant to Part 369.6
of the Regulations could result in a civil penalty of $10,000 for each
violation. As with other violations of the Act, willful violations can
result in imprisonment, criminal fines, and denial of export
privileges.
IX. ENFORCEMENT
As stated above, the Amendments mandate a number of
changes relating to the enforcement of the export control laws.
Congress attempted to balance the nation's need to improve export
performance with the need to more effectively control the diversion
of strategic technology to potential adversaries. On December 30,
1985, the OEA published revised Regulations governing violations
of the Act.' 12 These Regulations incorporate the statutory changes
and revised procedures for imposing administrative sanctions for vi-
olations of any Regulation relating to both the export controls and
the antiboycott provisions.
Violations of the Act and the Regulations fall into two general
categories: exporting without a license and exporting in a manner
contrary to the terms of the license. Typical violations of the law
and the Regulations include diversion from a designated country of
destination to an unauthorized country, making false or misleading
statements, and exporting to a person listed in the Table of Denial
Orders. The Amendments establish as separate offenses: violating,
conspiring to violate and attempting to violate the Act or the Regu-
lations.1 1 3 Other offenses include failing to report that a controlled
commodity is being used in a controlled country for military or in-
telligence-gathering purposes contrary to the conditions under
which a license is issued, possessing goods or technology in viola-
tion of an export control imposed under the Act or any Regulation
and taking any action to evade the provisions of the Act.
Criminal violations are referred to the U.S. attorney for prose-
cution in the federal district court. Civil violations are handled ad-
ministratively by the Department of Commerce.
The civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Act are
considerable. Civil penalties may be imposed for each violation of
the Act or any Regulation, either in addition to, or instead of, any
other liability or penalty. The civil penalty may not exceed $10,000
112. 15 C.F.R. Parts 370, 372, 387 and 388 (1986).
113. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1985).
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for each violation except that civil penalties for each violation in-
volving national security controls may not exceed $100,000. In ad-
dition, a violator can have his export privileges suspended, revoked
or denied and, in some cases, be denied import privileges. Any per-
son who violates any law, regulation or order can also be barred
from practice before the International Trade Commission.
A knowing violation of the Act or the Regulations is punish-
able by a fine of the greater of $50,000 or five times the value of the
export, imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.' 14 A
willful violation by a company of the national security or foreign
policy controls is punishable by the greater of a fine of no more than
$1,000,000 or five times the value of the export. A willful violation
by an individual is punishable by a fine of not more than $250,000
or imprisonment a period not to exceed 10 years, or both.115
Any false or misleading statement or concealment of material
facts, whether in connection with the license application, boycott
reports, export declarations, investigating or compliance proceed-
ings are punishable by fine of not more than $10,000 or by impris-
onment for not more than five years or both, for each violation. 116
In addition, commodities or technical data which have been, are
being or are intended to be exported or shipped from the United
States in violation of the Act or any Regulation, are subject to
seizure and forfeiture." 7
The Department of Commerce and the Customs Service are
responsible for administering the enforcement functions. 18 The
Commerce Department has primary responsibility for adminis-
trating the export control and antiboycott provisions of the Act and
imposing civil penalties, administrative sanctions and temporary de-
nial orders.11 I Customs is responsible for enforcing suspected viola-
tions of the Act at borders and ports-of-entry to and from the
United States. 120 Within the United States, Commerce and Cus-
toms may conduct investigations either independently or jointly. 21
Enforcement proceedings are often settled informally. Formal
proceedings commence with a charging letter by the OEA and are
114. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a) (1985).
115. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b) (1985).
116. Id.
117. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(g) (1985).
118. 50 U.S.C. § 2411 (1985).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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heard by an administrative law judge.121
While the Regulations provide that records must only be re-
strained for two years (except antiboycott requirements which must
be retained for three years), the statute of limitations for criminal
and for administrative compliance proceedings is five years and
records should be retained for the full five year period.1 23
X. CONCLUSION
It is too early to know whether the 1985 Amendments will be
able to reconcile the conflicting philosophical, political, and juris-
dictional interests in the area of technology exports. It is also too
early to know whether the "streamlining" measures will speed i-
cense reviews. We shall have to wait to see whether the government
will be successful in deterring illegal diversions of technology, a
crime recently coined "Technotheft". There is, however, no doubt
that enforcement of export controls are a high Government priority
and will remain so in the foreseeable future.
What is the role of a lawyer who counsels exporters? A lawyer
must be able to update exporters on the Regulations which change
daily. He can educate management as to the seriousness of the con-
trols and the importance of compliance. A lawyer can also work
directly with OEA or the Customs Service to help resolve the
problems faced by the exporter who finds a license application is
bogged down or a product shipment has been erroneously detained
by the Services Operation Exodus.
More importantly, a lawyer can work with his exporting cli-
ents to develop export internal compliance programs for Distribu-
tion Licenses. 24 In September 1985, the Commerce Department
published Export Management Internal Control Guidelines for U.S.
Exporters and Foreign Consignees. These guidelines were developed
to assist Distribution License applicants in understanding and es-
tablishing the required Internal Control Program. The guidelines
begin with a glossary of terms and abbreviations and they explain
the Distribution License Regulations, outline the steps involved in
developing an Internal Control Program, describe the elements re-
quired in such a program, and answer frequently asked questions.
These guidelines may be obtained from either the local OEA Field
122. 15 C.F.R. Part 388 (1986).
123. 15 C.F.R. § 387.13 (1986).
124. 15 C.F.R. § 373.3(e) (1986).
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Offices or OEA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. 2 '
Finally, the lawyer can assist the exporter as he prepares for a
compliance audit. Regular compliance audits are a recent change in
the operating procedures of the OEA. Until 1984, Commerce has
conducted only one Distribution License audit in 1977.
Under the new Act the future will improve for exporters. The
Amendments incorporate those changes for which the business
community fought most ardently. Policy-makers appear to under-
stand business' concerns and appear to be more willing to work
with the business community.
125. For more information regarding Distribution Licenses, call OEA, Multiple Licens-
ing Branch, at (202) 377-3287 or (202) 377-4196.
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APPENDIX A
COUNTRY GROUPS
For export control purposes, foreign countries are separated
into seven country groups designated by the symbols "Q", "S",
"T", "V", "Y", and "Z". Listed below are the countries included
in each country group. Canada is not included in any country
group and is referred to by name throughout the Export Adminis-
tration Regulations.
Country Group Q
Romania
Country Group S
Libya
Country Group T
North America
Northern Area:
Greenland
Miquelon and St. Pierre Islands
Southern Area:
Mexico (including Cozumel and Revilla Gigedo Islands)
Central America:
Belize
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras (including Bahia and Swan Islands)
Panama
Bermuda and Caribbean Area:
Bahamas
Barbados
Bermuda
Dominican Republic
French West Indies
Haiti (including Gonave and Tortuga Islands)
Jamaica
Leeward and windward Islands
Netherlands Antilles
Trinidad and Tobago
South America
Northern Area:
Columbia
19873
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French Guiana (including Inini)
Guyana
Surinam
Venezuela
Western Area:
Bolivia
Chile
Equador (including the Galapagos Islands)
Peru
Eastern Area:
Argentina
Brazil
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)
Paraguay
Uruguay
Country Group V
Southern Rhodesia
All countries not included in any other group (except Canada).
Country Group W
Hungary
Poland
Country Group Y
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Estonia
German Democratic Republic (including East Berlin)
Laos
Latvia
Lithuania
Outer Mongolia
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Country Group Z
Cuba
Kampuchea
Nicaragua
North Korea
Vietnam
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APPENDIX B
Sample "Written Assurances" Clause in a Distributor Agreement
United States Export Control
(a) DISTRIBUTOR acknowledges that exportation of the
Product may be subject to compliance with the United States Ex-
port Administration Act of 1979 and the Export Administration
Act of 1985, as those Acts are amended from time to time, and the
rules and regulations promulgated from time to time thereunder
(collectively, the "Act"), which restricts the export and reexport of
software media, technical data and direct products of technical
data. (b) DISTRIBUTOR agrees to obtain written assurances of
exportation of technical data substantially in the form of this Sub-
paragraph and hereby certifies that no technical data or direct prod-
ucts therefore will be made available or re-exported, directly or
indirectly, to the People's Republic of China, Romania, Libya,
Hungary, Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Ger-
man Democratic Republic (including East Berlin), Loas, Latvia,
Nicaragua, Lithuania, Mongolian People's Republic, Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics, South Africa, Cuba, Kampuchea, North
Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan, unless prior authorization, if re-
quired, is obtained by DISTRIBUTOR from the office of Export
Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, International
Trade Administration in accordance with the Export Administra-
tion Regulations (15 C.F.R. Sections 368 et seq.) issued by the De-
partment of Commerce of the United States in the administration of
the Act. SELLER agrees to assist DISTRIBUTOR in obtaining
any license required under the Act. The provisions of this clause
may extend to other countries or exclude one or more of the above
countries upon notice by SELLER to DISTRIBUTOR that such
countries are required by United States law or regulation to be ad-
ded or deleted.
(c) In addition, DISTRIBUTOR also agrees that with respect
to compliance with the United States Export Regulations:
(i) DISTRIBUTOR will comply with all the U.S.
Export Regulations including but not limited to the Anti-
boycott Laws and Regulations as such laws and regula-
tions relate to the Product;
(ii) DISTRIBUTOR will retain all export control
documents for a period of five (5) years and will permit
audits or reviews by SELLER covering export activity re-
lated to the Product;
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(iii) DISTRIBUTOR understands that SELLER
reserves the right to refuse performance of its obligations
under this Agreement in cases of non-compliance by DIS-
TRIBUTOR of the U.S. Export Regulations; and
(iv) DISTRIBUTOR will not engage in any transac-
tion or activity with any party, firm or company notified
by the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Export
Administration to be unsuitable or listed on the Table of
Denial Orders.
(d) DISTRIBUTOR agrees to indemnify SELLER against
any claim, demand, action, proceeding, investigation, loss, liability,
cost or expense suffered or incurred by SELLER and arising out of
or related to any violation (whether intentional or unintentional) by
DISTRIBUTOR or its customers of any of the warranties or cove-
nants in this Paragraph.
